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The Geneva Conventions in 21st 
Century Warfare:  How the 
Conventions Should Treat Civilians’ 
Direct Participation in Hostilities 
INTRODUCTION:  TARGETING IN AN 
ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗ 
Abstract 
This is the introduction to a collection of articles to be published in the 
Valparaiso University Law Review.  The articles address the challenges 
presented by non-traditional warfare and non-traditional combatants in the 
contexts of the War on Terror and the trend toward multilateral and 
humanitarian interventions.  Two of the contributions, those of Jonathan Hafetz 
and David Frakt, detail the hybrid model, part criminal law, part law of war, 
that the United States developed for addressing the status of detainees in the 
War on Terror.  Two of the contributions, those of Rachel VanLandingham and 
Iain Pedden, propose international models for addressing the challenges of the 
new warfare, while Laurie Blank advocates a new focus on enforcement at both 
the national and international levels to address violations of the principle of 
distinction.  Read together, the articles in this collection present a convincing 
argument that the United States needs to work with other states and 
international organizations to forge international solutions to the international 
problems posed by the new warfare. 
 
Thomas Friedman has recently observed that “the world is flat”—
that is, as far as global economic competition is concerned—the playing 
field is increasingly level.1  This is not the case in the realm of warfare.  
On the contrary, as armed conflict increasingly involves non-state actors 
opposed to state actors, or intervention in failed states by coalitions that 
draw on the capabilities of the major military powers, the disparity in 
military power and technology among the parties to armed conflict has 
                                                 
∗ Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
1 THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT:  A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 46–47 (2005). 
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increased markedly.2  Unable to beat state militaries at their own game, 
non-state actors and the armed forces of weak states resort to tactics that 
skirt or distort the laws of armed conflict, and as they do so, states 
struggle to respond in a manner that is both militarily effective and 
consistent with the Law of Armed Conflict (“LOAC”).  The result is a 
blurring of the distinction at the center of LOAC between combatants 
and non-combatants.3  In asymmetrical warfare, every targeting decision 
is fraught with uncertainties because the lines separating those who 
lawfully may be targeted from those who may not have grown 
ambiguous. 
This Issue offers various proposals to address the increasing 
challenge of targeting in the context of asymmetrical warfare.  Taken 
together, the contributions to this Issue suggest that states, confronted 
with threats to their armed forces and to civilians from non-conventional 
forces, have improvised, creating ad hoc legal regimes to address the 
challenges of what one of our contributors has called the “new warfare,” 
in which armed conflict “now takes place everywhere—in cities, refugee 
camps and other historically non-military areas” rather than on 
traditional battlefields.4 
Part I of this Introduction lays out the framework created by the 
Geneva Conventions (“the Conventions”)5 and their Additional 
Protocols (“AP I” and “AP II” respectively)6 within which targeting 
decisions are made.  It also addresses the recent efforts by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (“ICRC”) to provide 
                                                 
2 See Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 62 
A.F. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2008) (describing the various asymmetries relevant to contemporary 
warfare). 
3 See GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW IN WAR 251 (2010) (calling distinction “the most significant battlement concept a 
combatant must observe”). 
4 Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:  Operationalizing the Law 
of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 45 (2010). 
5 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter GC III].  
6 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 
1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]. 
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guidelines for state actors confronting non-combatants who directly 
participate in hostilities.  In Part II, this Introduction summarizes two 
contributions to this Issue that highlight ways in which the United States 
has primarily relied on domestic mechanisms in attempting to devise 
strategies that can address the problems that have arisen in asymmetrical 
conflicts—such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Finally, in Part III, the 
Introduction summarizes three contributions to this Issue that propose 
ways forward through transnational mechanisms that will enable states 
to address the challenges of the new warfare without violating LOAC 
principles or compromising national security.  Read together, the 
contributions to this Issue present a convincing argument that the United 
States needs to work with other states and international organizations to 
forge international solutions to the international problems posed by the 
new warfare. 
I.  THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
Asymmetrical warfare creates difficulties with respect to LOAC’s 
fundamental categories regarding conflict status and combatant status.7  
In terms of the former, the Conventions create two types of conflict for 
LOAC purposes, international armed conflict (“IAC”) governed by 
Article 2 common to all four of the Conventions (“CA 2”),8 and non-
international armed conflict (“NIAC”), governed by Article 3 common to 
all four of the Conventions (“CA 3”).9  But contemporary conflicts are 
often a mixture of the two, compounded by internal disturbances that 
might not rise to the level of armed conflict.10 
                                                 
7 In a recent three-part series of articles, Samuel Estreicher has explored the possibility 
LOAC could privilege guerilla tactics in war.  Estreicher raises concerns that certain ICRC 
statements have the unintended effect of encouraging those engaged in asymmetrical 
warfare to provoke state actors to engage in defensive measures that will help the guerillas 
to recruit more fighters.  Estreicher concludes that LOAC needs to establish incentives to 
discourage harm done to civilians by both sides in asymmetrical conflicts.  See Samuel 
Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part III)?:  The Intentional Killing of Civilians 
Under International Humanitarian Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 589 (2012); Samuel Estreicher, 
Privileging Asymmetric Warfare (Part II)?:  The “Proportionality” Principle Under International 
Humanitarian Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 143 (2011); Samuel Estreicher, Privileging Asymmetric 
Warfare? Part I:  Defender Duties Under International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 425 (2010). 
8 GC III, supra note 5.  CA 2 defines IAC as “all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties . . . [and] all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting 
Party . . . .”  Id. 
9 See generally supra note 5 (citing all Conventions).  While the Conventions do not 
define NIAC, all armed conflicts that are not IAC are considered NIAC.  The main 
challenge is in determining when internal disturbances rise to the level of NIAC. 
10 SOLIS, supra note 3, at 156.  Gary Solis refers to such conflicts as “dual status” armed 
conflicts.  Id. 
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The new warfare gives rise to new legal challenges, which existing 
scholarship has only begun to address.  The Bush administration took 
the position in the War on Terror that the conflict in Afghanistan was 
neither IAC nor NIAC, thus justifying a decision to deprive Taliban and 
al Qaeda detainees of all protections afforded by LOAC, including those 
of CA 3.11  The Supreme Court rejected this position, finding that the war 
in Afghanistan was a form of NIAC and that detainees were thus entitled 
at least to the humane treatment listed in CA 3.12  However, the War on 
Terror is not limited in its scope to Iraq and Afghanistan.13  When the 
United States engages with Taliban fighters in Pakistan or targets terror 
suspects in Yemen or Somalia, the conflict defies easy categorization.14 
In addition to conflict status, the new warfare blurs the lines that 
separate combatants from civilians and thus undermines the principle of 
distinction that “lies at the heart of the law governing warfare.”15  Many 
of the difficulties of classification are attributable to the phenomenon 
known as direct participation in hostilities (“DPH”) by non-combatants.  
The basic principle of distinction posits that civilians enjoy immunity 
from direct attack in the context of armed conflict “unless and for such 
time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”16 
In the IAC context, the Conventions and the Additional Protocols 
define the term “civilians” only negatively—as those not belonging to 
the armed forces of a party to a conflict and not participating in a levée en 
                                                 
11 See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, & William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 
10 (Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/ 
02.01.22.pdf (discussing the application of treaties and laws to al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees);  Memorandum Concerning Humane Treatment of al Qaeda & Taliban 
Detainees from President George W. Bush to Richard B. Cheney, Vice President et al. 1 
(Feb. 7, 2002), available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.02. 
07.pdf (“I accept the legal conclusion of the Department of Justice and determine that none 
of the provisions of Geneva apply to our conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or 
elsewhere throughout the world . . . .”). 
12 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (noting the broad, intended 
scope of the term “non-international armed conflict” and finding CA 3 applied to the 
conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan). 
13 See Jonathan Hafetz, Redefining State Power and Individual Rights in the War on 
Terrorism, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 843, 847 (2012) (noting the battlefield in the War on Terror is 
global and the duration of the conflict is open-ended). 
14 Cf. id. at 3 (observing some Guantánamo Bay detainees were captured in Bosnia and 
The Gambia). 
15 Laurie Blank, Taking Distinction to the Next Level:  Accountability for Fighters’ Failure to 
Distinguish Themselves from Civilians, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 765, 765 (2012).  The principle of 
distinction was first codified in the AP I.  AP I, supra note 6, at art. 48.  Nonetheless, states 
recognize the principle as binding customary law.  Blank, supra, at 769. 
16 AP I, supra note 6, at art. 51. 
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masse.17  In the NIAC context, it is far more difficult to draw clear lines 
between civilians and combatants.  The ICRC concludes that civilians are 
“all persons who are not members of [s]tate armed forces or organized 
armed groups of a party to the conflict.”18 
After six years of consultation and drafting,19 the ICRC in 2009 
published its Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (“ICRC Guidance”).  
While this document by no means settles the innumerable issues 
surrounding DPH,20 it has in fact been subject to numerous critical 
commentaries.21 It has considerable persuasive authority and certainly 
sets out the parameters for debate. 
While combatants generally may not target civilians, they may target 
those who DPH.  In addition, harm to people who DPH need not be 
                                                 
17 See id. at art. 50(1).  AP I also defines armed forces of a party to a conflict as:   
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized armed 
forces, groups and units which are under a command responsible to 
that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even if that Party is 
represented by a government or an authority not recognized by an 
adverse Party.  Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal 
disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the 
rules of international law applicable in armed conflict. 
Id. at art. 43(1). 
18 Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991, 1002 (2008) [hereinafter ICRC 
Guidance], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-872-reports-
documents.pdf.  Other sources site to different pagination, but this Introduction will refer 
to this version. 
19 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of 
Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law:  An Introduction to the 
Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637, 637–38 (2010) (noting the document was the result 
of a six-year process, including meetings of military and humanitarian law experts in 
Geneva and The Hague between 2003 and 2008). 
20 See David J.R. Frakt, Direction Participation in Hostilities as a War Crime:  America’s Failed 
Efforts to Change the Law of War, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 729, 730 (2012) (arguing it could not do 
so, as the numerous meetings aided the ICRC in drafting its “Guidance” did not produce a 
consensus in all areas).  
21 See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study:  
No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 830 (2010) 
(concluding that Part IX of the ICRC Guidance ignored the advice of its experts, which 
resulted in faulty conclusions presented without supporting information); Michael N. 
Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities:  A Critical 
Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 5, 6 (2010) (noting some scholars, including Schmitt himself, 
participated in the meetings that produced the ICRC Guidance, but ultimately withdrew 
their names from the final draft); Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost:  Organized Armed 
Groups and the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL. 641, 643 (2010) (finding the ICRC Guidance failed to resolve long-standing 
debates regarding the distinction between combatants and civilians and targeting in non-
international armed conflicts). 
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considered when assessing whether or not a targeting decision was 
proportional, in the LOAC sense of not causing excessive harm to 
civilians or non-military property.22  The ICRC Guidance recognizes the 
need for combatants to be able to target civilians who DPH to protect 
themselves from attack and also to achieve military objectives. 
But the most difficult challenge posed by the DPH problem is 
determining where to draw the line between a civilian who may not be 
targeted and one who may due to DPH.23  The ICRC defines DPH as 
“specific hostile acts carried out by individuals as part of the conduct of 
hostilities between parties to an armed conflict.”24  To qualify as DPH, 
the conduct in question must satisfy three prongs:  a threshold of harm, 
direct causation, and the belligerent nexus.25  A civilian unconnected to 
any organized armed group is a legitimate target during all phases of 
DPH activities, including preparatory acts and travel to and from the site 
of the DPH activity.26  A member of a non-state organized armed group 
who engages in DPH activity is a legitimate target for the duration of her 
membership in the group,27 so long as that person engages in 
“continuous combat function.”28 
The ICRC recognizes that DPH greatly complicates the challenges of 
implementing the principle of distinction in targeting decisions.29  
Nonetheless, the ICRC Guidance stresses the need for the people 
responsible for making targeting decisions to take “all feasible 
precautions” to avoid targeting civilians not engaged in DPH.30  In 
addition, in a highly controversial section of the ICRC Guidance,31 the 
ICRC posits, “the kind and degree of force which is permissible against 
persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed 
what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in 
                                                 
22 Schmitt, supra note 21, at 13. 
23 See id. at 14 (calling the concept of civilian status the greatest source of controversy 
among those who participated in drafting the ICRC Guidance). 
24 ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1015. 
25 Id. at 1016–31. 
26 Id. at 1031–33, 1035–36.  For an in-depth critique of the ICRC Guidance’s handling of 
this issue, see Bill Boothby, “And for Such Time As”:  The Time Dimension to Direct 
Participation in Hostilities, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 741, 743 (2010) (identifying three ways 
in which the ICRC definition of DPH is too narrow). 
27 ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1036–37. 
28 See id. at 1007 (“[T]he decisive criterion for individual membership in an organized 
armed group is whether a person assumes a continuous function for the group involving 
his or her direct participation in hostilities.”).  But see Schmitt, supra note 21, at 21–24 
(calling into question the practicality of the continuous combat function criterion). 
29 ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1039. 
30 Id. at 1039–40. 
31 See Parks, supra note 21, at 772. 
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the prevailing circumstances.”32  Critics of the ICRC Guidance object that 
this passage imports a human rights principle, the right to life, into the 
lex specialis of armed conflict.33 
LOAC always involves a careful reconciliation of military necessity 
and the principle of humanity.34  At least some scholars familiar with the 
ICRC Guidance have concluded that it deviates “from the generally 
accepted balance” and that states will therefore view the Guidance 
skeptically.35  Moreover, while the ICRC has provided important 
guidance in its work on DPH, much of the work, including that of the 
ICRC, has merely laid the groundwork for identifying civilians who 
lawfully may be targeted.  In its publications on DPH, the ICRC has 
focused for the most part on explicating rather than developing the law.  
Its guidance is an attempt to tease out the consequences of existing law, 
primarily the Geneva Conventions, for civilians directly participating in 
hostilities.  The contributions to this Issue are not so limited.  Rather, 
they offer predictions about the future development of LOAC relating to 
asymmetrical warfare and make recommendations regarding how it 
ought to develop. 
II.  THE UNITED STATES’ AD HOC SOLUTIONS TO THE CHALLENGES OF THE 
NEW WARFARE 
The ICRC and legal scholars have devoted relatively little thought to 
an enforcement regime that would deter civilians from engaging in DPH 
activities through mechanisms other than military targeting.  The result 
has been the rise of a sort of legal limbo in which states create ad hoc 
systems of detention and review for people suspected of combatancy in 
asymmetrical conflicts.  By their very nature, such ad hoc systems raise 
due process questions under both domestic and international law.  As 
the rules are not devised in advance, people caught in the web of 
improvised detention schemes lack notice, access to information and to 
other tools that they need to defend themselves against accusations that 
they are terrorists, enemy combatants or civilians unlawfully engaged in 
DPH. 
Professors Frakt and Hafetz point out that DPH itself is not a war 
crime.36  That being the case, civilians who engage in combatancy can be 
prosecuted for ordinary crimes or for crimes (such as attacking civilians) 
                                                 
32 ICRC Guidance, supra note 18, at 1044. 
33 Parks, supra note 21, at 797. 
34 Schmitt, supra note 21, at 6. 
35 Id. at 6–7. 
36 See Frakt, supra note 20, at 733 (citing to the ICRC Guidance for the proposition that 
LOAC “neither prohibits nor privileges civilian direct participation in hostilities”). 
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that they commit as part of their DPH activities.  While Professor Hafetz 
explores the damage that the ad hoc detention systems created during the 
War on Terror have done to the U.S. system of justice, Professor Frakt 
notes the conceptual gap between the dominant view that DPH is not a 
war crime and the U.S. decision to prosecute people for DPH during the 
War on Terror.  Their contributions suggest that the United States has 
developed two models for addressing DPH—a war model and a criminal 
model.  Neither model is entirely consistent with constitutional and 
LOAC protections of detainees. 
A. The Failed War Model for Dealing with DPH 
Professor Hafetz details the consequences of the existing confusion 
between a military and a criminal model for dealing with terror suspects.  
Since terror suspects are neither combatants subject to the strictures of 
LOAC nor criminals subject to domestic criminal law, the United States 
and other states have created regimes that give rise to new forms of 
military detention and expanded targeted killing programs, whose 
legality is open to question, as well as enhanced interrogation 
techniques, which are clearly unlawful.37  Professor Hafetz’s work 
illustrates the harm that can arise to domestic legal systems when they 
improvise solutions to gaps in international enforcement regimes.38 
Professor Hafetz describes the ad hoc regimes developed under the 
Bush administration in his recent book, Habeas Corpus after 9/11.39  As 
Professor Hafetz notes, the mechanisms that the United States adopted 
to address the threat of terrorism after 9/11 were not all necessitated by 
existing gaps in LOAC.  Although the United States had complied with 
the Geneva Conventions in previous conflicts even when its enemies had 
not, the Bush administration “deliberately scuttled” that legal framework 
in the War on Terror.40  Instead, relying on a series of secret memos 
generated by lawyers working in the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (the “OLC”), the administration created “a category of 
prisoners outside the law.”41  Overriding objections from Secretary of 
State Colin Powell and his legal advisor, William H. Taft IV, the Bush 
administration adopted the OLC’s position that the “Geneva 
                                                 
37 See Hafetz, supra note 13, at 845 (discussing the Bush administration’s interrogation 
techniques as having “bordered on, and in some cases amounted to, torture”). 
38 See id. at 856 (arguing that the United States’ adoption of a war paradigm as part of its 
counter-terrorism strategy has resulted in an expansion of state power at the expense of 
individual liberties). 
39 JONATHAN HAFETZ, HABEAS CORPUS AFTER 9/11:  CONFRONTING AMERICA’S NEW 
GLOBAL DETENTION SYSTEM (2011). 
40 Id. at 16. 
41 Id. at 18. 
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Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda or the Taliban.”42 The lawlessness 
of the United States’ conduct in the War on Terror was, at least in part, 
intentional.  According to Professor Hafetz, the Bush administration’s 
decision to establish a detention facility for terror suspects at the U.S. 
Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, was motivated by its belief that 
“Guantánamo would be beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts and 
thus immune from judicial review.”43  The administration also believed 
that those detained at Guantánamo would be effectively beyond the 
jurisdictional reach of the writ of habeas corpus.44  
Before it settled on the confusing appellation of “unlawful enemy 
combatant,” the Bush administration evidenced confusion regarding the 
status of those brought to the detention facility at Guantánamo.  On the 
one hand, Bush administration officials compared Guantánamo 
detainees with enemy soldiers detained during prior wars.45  Treating 
the detainees as battlefield “combatants” permitted the indefinite 
detention of those captured just as one can detain any enemy combatant 
during a conventional armed conflict for the duration of that conflict.46  
At the same time, the Bush administration referred to the detainees as 
“terrorists” and as “the worst of the worst,” suggesting that they were 
detained for criminal activities rather than as battlefield combatants.47  In 
fact, many of the detainees were simply in the wrong place at the wrong 
time,48 but the United States did not accord them a hearing to determine 
their combatant status, as required by both the Geneva Conventions and 
Army Regulation 1908.49  As a result, Guantánamo became a “legal black 
                                                 
42 Id. at 20. 
43 Id. at 29. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 33. 
46 Id.  Prisoners of war captured during an international armed conflict may be detained 
until the conflict is ended through surrender or peace treaty.  See Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135 (“Prisoners of War shall be released and repatriated without delay after the 
cessation of active hostilities.”); see also Hafetz, supra note 13, at 847 (citing Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004), in support of the generally recognized legitimacy of 
detention of enemy fighters to prevent their return to the battlefield). 
47 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 33–34 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining the 
confusing nomenclature used by Bush administration officials to describe the status of the 
detainees at Guantánamo). 
48 See id. at 36–37 (describing some of the “victims of incompetent battlefield vetting”). 
49 See GC III, supra note 5, at art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, 
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, [should 
be treated as Prisoners of War], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”); 
HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 35–36 (noting in the War on Terror, the United States abandoned 
its practice, established during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars, of providing tribunals 
consistent with Article 5 of GC III). 
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hole” in which the detainees were tossed indefinitely based on elements 
of the Geneva Conventions, but in which they were stripped of the 
privileges guaranteed by those same Conventions.50 
While the detention facility at Guantánamo, along with the Iraqi 
prison, Abu Ghraib, garnered most of the media attention, they were just 
part of a “U.S.-run global detention system.”51  Other U.S.-operated 
detention facilities were at least as bad as Guantánamo.  Conditions at 
Bagram Theater Internment Facility at the Bagram Air Base (“Bagram”) 
were so horrific that one prisoner who experienced internment at both 
Bagram and Guantánamo described his experience at the former as “the 
longest days of [his] life.”52  The ICRC reported gross mistreatment at 
Bagram in violation of the Geneva Conventions, and at least two 
detainees died at Bagram as a result of brutal interrogations during 
which they sustained injuries equivalent to what would have occurred 
had they been “run over by a bus.”53  Like the detainees at Guantánamo, 
the Bagram detainees did not get the benefit of status review by a 
“competent tribunal” as required by the Geneva Conventions.  Instead, 
the United States introduced Enemy Combatant Review Boards, whose 
procedures “lacked the safeguards necessary to achieve accurate 
results.”54 
The detention systems set up in Iraq were not much different.  U.S.-
operated detention centers in Iraq held civilians as well as combatants 
without adequate review procedures that might insure that, consistent 
with LOAC, the United States was justified in continuing to intern those 
it had detained.55  In Professor Hafetz’s view, Iraq became another 
Guantánamo, highlighting “the dangers of extrajudicial detention and 
the importance of habeas corpus.”56 
Professor Hafetz does his best to describe conditions at the prisons 
about which we have some information, but he cannot describe what 
occurred in the name of the War on Terror at various CIA “black sites” at 
which even the identity of the prisoners is not revealed and to which the 
ICRC has no access, itself a violation of LOAC.57  In order to effectuate 
                                                 
50 See id. at 34 (noting Guantánamo detainees were afforded neither the protections 
owed to prisoners of war nor those afforded to criminal suspects). 
51 Hafetz, supra note 13, at 846. 
52 HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 49 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 50. 
55 See id. at 62–63 (describing the inadequacies of the status review procedures 
established by the U.S.-led Multi-National Force–Iraq). 
56 Id. at 67. 
57 See id. at 58–60 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing the network of secret 
prisons into which hundreds of “ghost prisoners” disappeared). 
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the delivery of terror suspects to black sites and to countries that would 
conduct the sort of interrogations that U.S. law does not permit, the 
United States developed a program of “extraordinary rendition.”58  This 
                                                 
58 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 51–60 (describing some detainees who were subject to 
extraordinary rendition); Hafetz, supra note 13, at 851 (describing the transition in U.S. use 
of rendition from “rendition to justice” to “extraordinary rendition”); see also First 
Amended Compl. at 1, ¶2, Mohammed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-02798 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 1, 2007) (characterizing extraordinary rendition as involving the “clandestine and 
forcible transportation of terrorism suspects to secret overseas detention facilities where 
they are placed beyond the reach of the law and subjected to torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment”); Leila Nadya Sadat, Extraordinary Rendition, 
Torture, and Other Nightmares from the War on Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1200, 1201 n.4 
(2007) (relying on definitions of “extraordinary rendition” provided by the New York City 
Bar Association and Wikipedia (internal quotation marks omitted)). Recent scholarship 
exploring the government’s extraordinary rendition program includes the following:  Alan 
W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture:  A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(providing a history of the development of government-sponsored rendition, which was 
used initially to bring fugitives to trial, and describing the significant expansion of the 
United States’ extraordinary rendition program under the George W. Bush administration 
until its abolition in January 2009); Lucien J. Dhooge, The State Secrets Privilege and Corporate 
Complicity in Extraordinary Rendition, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 469 (2009) (concluding the 
state secrets privilege appropriately shields the policy of extraordinary rendition from 
judicial examination); Louis Fisher, Extraordinary Rendition:  The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1405 (2008) (arguing from the Founding era until 9/11, it was generally understood 
that rendition required congressional authorization and was for the purpose of bringing a 
fugitive to trial); Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege:  
Keeping Focus on the Task at Hand, 33 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 629 (2008) (suggesting 
means of oversight of executive actions through the court’s role in providing individuals 
the opportunity to vindicate their rights, while also protecting legitimate state secrets); 
Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution:  The Case of Maher Arar, 28 REV. 
LITIG. 479 (2008) (relating that since 9/11, the United States has “reportedly transferred 
more than 100 suspected terrorists to countries that routinely torture prisoners” and 
focusing on the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar); Daniel L. Pines, Rendition 
Operations:  Does U.S. Law Impose Any Restrictions?, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 523 (2011) 
(concluding U.S. law provides few legal restrictions and very few practical limitations on 
the ability of the United States in rendition operations, whether to the United States or 
elsewhere); Sadat, supra (examining the law governing rendition from U.S. territories or by 
U.S. agents and arguing that the extraordinary rendition program from occupied Iraq 
violates basic principles and precedents of international law); Margaret L. Satterthwaite, 
Rendered Meaningless:  Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1333 (2007) (contending that rendition is among the anti-terror techniques that the U.S. 
government has defended through legal arguments that intentionally “skirt[ ] the rule of 
law” by exploiting ambiguities and gaps in international human rights and humanitarian 
law); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses:  Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets 
Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REV. 429 (2012); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, The Law:  
“Extraordinary Rendition” and Presidential Fiat, 36 PRES. STUD. Q. 102 (2006) (arguing that, 
while U.S. Presidents have only recently claimed the power to authorize extraordinary 
renditions and that U.S. history suggests that such renditions are illegal, they are tolerated 
under principles of judicial deference to executive expertise); David Weissbrodt & Amy 
Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the Humanitarian Law of War and Occupation, 47 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 295 (2007) (contending that the United States’ extraordinary rendition program 
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program involved the United States in further violations of both U.S. and 
international law, which forbid the United States from delivering a 
person to a state in which the United States believes it is likely that the 
person will be subjected to torture.59 
The U.S. Supreme Court stepped in, deciding three cases in 2004,60 
which caused the Bush administration and Congress to devise new 
detention schemes in their continued efforts to place their detention 
policies beyond the review of any Article III court.  The Bush 
administration created the new Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
(“CSRT”) system, which purported to provide final determinations of 
the legality of continued detentions, thus eliminating the need for resort 
to the federal court system through habeas proceedings.61  As the cases 
challenging that unconstitutional elimination of habeas rights wended 
their way through the court system, Congress stepped in with the 
Detainee Treatment Act (”DTA”), which sought, among other things, to 
strip detainees of their habeas rights.62  Anticipating that the Supreme 
Court would restore habeas rights to detainees in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,63 
the Bush administration switched its model from wartime detention to 
criminal prosecution and transferred some detainees, like the alleged 
                                                                                                             
constitutes grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and proposing legal mechanisms to 
address those breaches); David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and 
the Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2006) (contending that extraordinary rendition 
violates both the UN Convention Against Torture and domestic law prohibitions on torture 
and conspiracy to commit torture); Matteo M. Winkler, When “Extraordinary” Means Illegal:  
International Law and European Reaction to the United States Rendition Program, 30 LOY. L.A. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33 (2008) (focusing on the European reaction to the abduction of Abu 
Omar in Italy and concluding that the U.S. extraordinary rendition program violates 
international legal norms prohibiting torture). 
59 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 56 (characterizing rendition as a violation of two 
international conventions to which the United States is a party:  the Convention against 
Torture and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)). 
60 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (finding the government’s 
treatment of Hamdi did not accord with the constitutional requirements of due process 
because he was given no opportunity to rebut the government’s allegations before a neutral 
adjudicatory body); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (permitting Guantánamo detainees 
to file habeas petitions challenging their detentions); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 425 (2004) 
(dismissing Padilla’s and al-Marri’s habeas petitions because they were filed against the 
wrong person and in the wrong court, but paving the way for the re-filing of the same 
petitions in the Fourth Circuit). 
61 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 135 (describing litigation in which the government 
claimed that the CSRT process “satisfied any rights [detainees] had” to due process). 
62 See id. at 140 (describing efforts to amend the federal habeas statute to eliminate habeas 
rights for Guantánamo detainees). 
63 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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“dirty bomber” Jose Padilla, to the federal court system.64  With Hamdan, 
the Supreme Court came full circle, striking down a domestic regime for 
dealing with detainees in wartime because it was inconsistent with 
international legal standards codified in CA3 of the Geneva 
Conventions.65 
While Professor Hafetz highlights U.S. violations of LOAC in the 
War on Terror, he also describes the ways in which various laws passed 
in connection with the War on Terror violated our own domestic legal 
traditions, especially those regarding the availability of the writ of habeas 
corpus.  He discusses in some detail the cases of Jose Padilla, Ali Saleh 
Kahlah al-Marri, and Yaser Hamdi, all of whom were detained 
incommunicado and denied access to lawyers.66  The fact that Padilla 
and Hamdi were U.S. citizens did not entitle them to any procedural 
rights, nor did it protect them against harsh treatment. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently upheld 
Padilla’s conviction and called for an increase in his sentence of 208 
months incarceration for conspiracy to harm people overseas and for 
material support for terror organizations.67  In her partial dissent, Judge 
Rosemary Barkett observed:   
Padilla presented substantial, detailed, and compelling 
evidence about the inhumane, cruel, and physically, 
emotionally, and mentally painful conditions in which 
he had already been detained for a period of almost four 
years.  For example, he presented evidence at sentencing 
of being kept in extreme isolation at the military brig in 
South Carolina where he was subjected to cruel 
interrogations, prolonged physical and mental pain, 
extreme environmental stresses, noise and temperature 
variations, and deprivation of sensory stimuli and 
sleep.68 
Judge Barkett also noted that none of these allegations were challenged 
on appeal.69 
                                                 
64 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 145 (noting Padilla was indicted on terrorism-related 
charges in Miami two days before the government’s response was due to Padilla’s renewed 
certiorari petition to the Supreme Court). 
65 See id. at 148 (summarizing Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–34). 
66 Id. at 73–78. 
67 United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1119 (11th Cir. 2011). 
68 Id. at 1131 (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
69 Id. 
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The Bush administration remained committed to its policy of 
extrajudicial detention.  Shortly after the Hamdan decision was issued, 
the Bush administration drafted and Congress passed the Military 
Commissions Act (“MCA”),70 which sought to interpret the Geneva 
Conventions so as to eliminate recourse to them as a possibility for those 
subject to detention in the War on Terror.71  The MCA also sought once 
again to strip detainees of their habeas rights.72  However, in Boumediene 
v. Bush,73 the Supreme Court once again ruled, in a five to four decision, 
that the CSRT process coupled with limited appellate review as provided 
in the DTA were inadequate substitutes for habeas proceedings.  The 
Court invalidated the MCA’s elimination of habeas rights for 
Guantánamo detainees and directed the government to conduct prompt 
hearings on the legality of continued detention of people captured in 
connection with the War on Terror and detained at Guantánamo.74  
While the Supreme Court has also recognized the possibility that 
detainees subject to U.S. control at foreign prisons may bring habeas suits, 
Hafetz notes that lower courts have significantly narrowed the 
availability of that remedy.75 
Professor Hafetz also rebuts arguments critical of the efficacy of a 
criminal law model for dealing with terrorists.  Professor Hafetz first 
addresses the objection that criminal law is limited in that it can only 
punish past wrongdoing rather than prevent future harm.76  However, 
prosecutors have actually been very successful in recent years in gaining 
convictions of terror suspects based on statutes imposing criminal 
                                                 
70 Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
71 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 152–53 (noting the MCA gave the President authority to 
interpret the Geneva Conventions and prohibited individuals from relying on the 
Conventions in judicial proceedings). 
72 Id. at 153. 
73 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
74 HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 158.  In Munaf v. Green, decided the same day as Boumediene, 
the Court considered habeas petitions brought by prisoners detained in Iraq under the 
authority of the Multi-National Force-Iraq. 553 U.S. 674 (2008).  Although the Court found 
that such prisoners could file habeas petition so long as they were subject to the authority of 
the United States, it also found these particular petitioners were detained for the purposes 
of criminal prosecution in a foreign country.  No U.S. court could provide relief in such 
cases.  HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 167–68.  Thus, while the Court seemed to be expanding (or 
reinforcing) the jurisdictional scope of habeas review, it also suggested that the government 
might easily evade such review by transferring custody to foreign governments.  But this 
practice raises problems regarding the non-refoulement obligation under international 
human rights law.  See id. at 194–95 (discussing human rights bodies’ construction of the 
obligation of non-refoulment as barring governments from transferring people in their 
custody, regardless of location, to other states in which the detainees will be in danger of 
being subjected to torture). 
75 Hafetz, supra note 13, at 848–49. 
76 HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 220. 
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penalties for providing “material support” to terrorist organizations and 
under conspiracy laws.77 
Professor Hafetz also addresses concerns regarding the difficulty in 
protecting state secrets in the context of criminal prosecutions of 
suspected terrorists.78  In so doing, Professor Hafetz relies on the 
Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”),79 which has 
successfully protected state secrets in criminal proceedings for decades, 
without significant diminution of the government’s ability to prosecute 
criminal suspects.80  Through discussion of numerous successful 
prosecutions of terror suspects,81 Professor Hafetz builds a convincing 
case that our criminal justice system is up to the challenges presented by 
asymmetrical warfare.82  The Bush administration’s strategy of seeking to 
place its detention system outside the law, beyond the review of any 
court, has proved to be unnecessary:  We can prosecute terrorists for 
their criminal conduct in a manner that is consistent with both our 
constitutional protections afforded to criminal suspects and with LOAC.  
Professor Frakt reaches the same conclusion with respect to DPH, noting 
that “the prosecution of civilians who directly participated in hostilities 
is, quite properly, handled by the domestic court system.”83  Professor 
Hafetz’s contribution to this volume builds on his earlier work and 
contends that the way in which the War on Terror has been 
institutionalized has done lasting harm to protections of civil liberties in 
the United States.  What seemed like “a temporary accommodation to 
the exigencies” of the War on Terror has resulted in “a permanent 
                                                 
77 Id. at 221–22; see Hafetz, supra note 13, at 855 (noting federal prosecutors have 
obtained over 400 convictions in terrorism-related cases since 9/11). 
78 HAFETZ, supra note 39,  at 223. 
79 Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025, 2025–21 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3). 
80 See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 89-172 A, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 
PROCEDURES ACT (CIPA):  AN OVERVIEW (1989), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
secrecy/89-172.pdf (“Congress enacted the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) 
to provide a . . . [means] for determining . . . whether a prosecution may proceed that both 
protects information the Executive regards as sensitive to security and assures the 
defendant a fair trial consistent with the mandates of the Constitution.” (footnote omitted)); 
Victor Hansen & Lawrence Friedman, The Case Against Secret Evidence, 12 ROGER WILLIAMS 
U. L. REV. 772, 786 (2007) (stating that CIPA was designed to address graymail cases “in 
which defendants threatened to disclose classified information at trial to force the 
government to dismiss the case”). 
81 See HAFETZ, supra note 39, at 226–27 (discussing prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui); 
id. at 228–29 (discussing prosecution of those responsible for bombing U.S. embassies in 
East Africa in 1998); id. at 255 (discussing prosecution of the shoe bomber, Richard Reid). 
82 See id. at 254 (noting all federal prosecutions and military commissions were 
problematic). 
83 Frakt, supra note 20, at 761. 
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transformation in the relationship among the state, society, and the 
individual.”84 
Professor Hafetz notes that the three branches of the federal 
government have contributed during the Obama administration to the 
continuation of policies introduced during the Bush administration.  
Although President Obama campaigned on a promise to close the 
detention center at Guantánamo, in practice, it has proven quite difficult 
to do so,85 in part because Congress has legislated aggressively to 
prevent Guantánamo’s closure.86  The Obama administration has also 
continued the Bush administration’s policy of indefinite detention of 
terror suspects,87 and in some cases Congress has pushed to expand the 
availability of indefinite detention to include new categories of 
detainees.88  Courts have generally acquiesced in indefinite detention 
schemes.89 
The Obama administration has also been unable to phase out the use 
of military commissions as it originally hoped to do.  Congressional 
opponents of the use of civilian criminal courts for the prosecution of 
terror suspects have actually expressed concern that constitutional 
protections available in such courts could impede prosecution.  
Moreover, they advocate the continued use of harsh interrogation 
techniques that they believe will enable the government to extract from 
detainees useful information relevant to potential future attacks on the 
United States, its citizens, or its installations.90  Finally, Professor Hafetz 
points out that the Obama administration has continued the Bush 
administration’s policy of using targeted killings as a tool in counter-
terrorism and has even expanded the program through the use of drone 
aircraft.91 
The dynamic of the U.S. War on Terror exhibits a striking parallel to 
Otto von Bismarck’s strategy that resulted in a conservative unification 
of Germany in the nineteenth century.92  Bismarck created a series of 
                                                 
84 Hafetz, supra note 13, at 857. 
85 Id. at 852. 
86 Id. at 853. 
87 Id. 
88 See id. (discussing the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act that would permit 
indefinite detention of persons whose conduct was unrelated to the 9/11 attacks and who 
were not affiliated with al Qaeda). 
89 Id. at 854. 
90 Id. at 855. 
91 Id. at 856. 
92 See HANS-ULRICH WEHLER, THE GERMAN EMPIRE 1871–1918, at 54–55 (1985) (observing 
the Emperor continued to control the three pillars of absolutism after unification but also 
controlled the new imperial administration, and thus the unification was not democratic 
but “autocratic, semi-absolutist sham constitutionalism”). 
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crises in the 1860s under the banner of the primacy of foreign policy 
(Primat der Außenpolitik), which led to wars with Denmark, Austria, and 
France.93  These international crises were then succeeded by engineered 
campaigns against various real or imagined enemies within:  the 
Kulturkampf with Catholics,94 the prolonged struggle against Democratic 
Socialism,95 as well as the introduction of discriminatory policies against 
Germany’s minority populations, including Poles, Jews, French, Danes, 
and Lithuanians.96  Along the way, Bismarck exploited fears of external 
or internal threats to promote new security measures.97  Liberals, who 
were the chief supporters of German unification,98 supported Bismarck, 
even though the unified Germany that he created preserved the 
autocracy, provincialism, and militarism that liberals had hoped to 
overcome through their cosmopolitan nationalism.99  Bismarck pulled off 
perhaps the greatest political trick of modern history.  He was never 
really concerned with foreign policy at all.  Rather, it was domestic 
policy that was really primary all along (Primat der Innenpolitik).100 
George W. Bush was not a political strategist of Bismarck’s caliber.  
Rather, the main characteristic that he as President shared with Bismarck 
as Chancellor was a tendency to manipulate foreign affairs for the 
purposes of a domestic agenda.101  Recall that Bush campaigned on a 
platform of building up the United States’ defensive capabilities but 
                                                 
93 See id. at 26–27 (calling the three wars “devices to legitimise the prevailing political 
system against the striving for social and political emancipation of the middle classes” and 
noting that “the three wars were waged for internal political reasons”). 
94 See ERICH EYCK, BISMARCK AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE 202–10 (1964) (describing the 
campaign in which Bismarck enrolled the Liberal Party to oppose the German Catholic 
Center Party). 
95 See id. at 236–37 (describing how Bismarck exploited a failed attempt to assassinate the 
Emperor to push for new laws against the Social Democrats, launching an anti-Socialist 
campaign that continued until the end of Bismarck’s career). 
96 See WEHLER, supra note 92, at 105–13 (describing various imperial policies that sought 
to weaken and undermine minority cultures within the Empire). 
97 See id. at 102 (noting the government’s response to challenges was to promote new 
laws “culminating in special measures which made a mockery of the notion of the equality 
of the citizen before the law”). 
98 See EYCK, supra note 94, at 175 (calling the National Liberal Party the “party of German 
unification”). 
99 See id. at 139–41 (noting that the Indemnity Bill, which resolved the Constitutional 
Crisis of the 1860s, forced a split in the German Liberal Party in which the defenders of 
“[t]he principle of the Rechtsstaat, of the state governed by law” were defeated by the forces 
more committed to unification). 
100 See WEHLER, supra note 92, at 184–92 (describing German foreign policy during the 
Kaiserrich as a product of the needs of domestic policy). 
101 See EYCK, supra note 94, at 57 (explaining that Bismarck was elevated to the position of 
Prussian Minister-President because he was willing to take on the Prussian Parliament, by 
dissolving it if necessary). 
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using the armed forces only for war, not for nation-building.102  But 9/11 
became the justification for extended nation-building campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.  Meanwhile, the Bush administration quickly 
seized on the opportunity provided by the 9/11 attacks to attempt a 
permanent renegotiation of the balance between civil liberties and 
national security.103  The most lasting legacy of the Bush administration, 
as Professor Hafetz illustrates, may well be the permanent expansion of 
the national surveillance state,104 and the exploitation of an attack that 
posed no existential threat to the United States to create a lasting state of 
emergency.105 
B. The Failed Criminal Law Approach to DPH 
Professor Frakt’s contribution to this Issue describes the attempt by 
the United States to treat DPH as a war crime and to prosecute detainees 
through military commissions.106  The basis for doing so has never been 
clear, as Professor Frakt cites to numerous authorities for the rule that 
DPH itself is not a violation of LOAC.107  The fact that DPH is not a 
violation of LOAC would not itself prevent the United States from 
treating it as a criminal offense for domestic purposes, as it sought to do 
first through an Executive Order from November 2001 and then through 
the 2006 Military Commissions Act (“MCA”).108  However, as Professor 
                                                 
102 See George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, The 2nd Presidential 
Debate (Oct. 11, 2000), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/ 
2000debates/2ndebate2.html) (“I don’t think our troops ought to be used for what’s called 
nation-building.  I think our troops ought to be used to fight and win war.”). 
103 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001); see also Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 77, 141–45 (2010) (describing the very weak legal rationale for the National Security 
Agency’s illegal warrantless wiretapping program). 
104 See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2008) (describing the “National Surveillance State” as “a new form of governance that 
features the collection, collation, and analysis of information about populations both in the 
United States and around the world”).  But see Orin S. Kerr, The National Surveillance State:  
A Response to Balkin, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2179, 2180 (2009) (arguing that the major change has 
not been the government’s approach to surveillance but the advent of new technologies). 
105 See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE STATE OF EXCEPTION 1122 (2005) (describing the frequency 
that western democratic parliamentary governments have been replaced by constitutional 
dictatorships based on the executive’s recognition of a real or imagined crisis). 
106 Frakt, supra note 20, at 732. 
107 Id. (citing Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by 
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 520 (2005)); ICRC Guidance, 
supra note 18, at 83. 
108 See 10 U.S.C. § 950v(b)(15)–(16) (2006) (creating the crimes of “Murder In Violation Of 
The Law of War” and “Destruction Of Property In Violation Of The Law Of War”); Order 
on Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 
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Frakt explains, in defining the crime, U.S. law always relied on a 
presumed criminal prohibition on DPH, creating great confusion in the 
ensuing case law.109 
Professor Frakt describes the idea of imposing criminal penalties for 
DPH as “novel and untested” when introduced by executive order in 
2001.110  The test did not go well.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invalidated the military commissions established by 
executive order before any detainees could be tried for unprivileged 
belligerency.111  Congress responded with the MCA, and most of 
Professor Frakt’s contribution describes the government’s attempts to 
use that piece of legislation to prosecute before military commissions a 
grand total of three detainees for DPH.  Professor Frakt details all seven 
cases brought before military commissions.  Two resulted in convictions 
after trial, five resulted in guilty pleas,112 and one resulted in dismissal of 
all charges.113  Professor Frakt is well-positioned to discuss this case law, 
as he was the appointed defense counsel to Mohammed Jawad, one of 
the Guantánamo detainees subject to prosecution.114    
The MCA seemed to address the criminalization of DPH by 
requiring that the offense be “in violation of the law of war.”   However, 
the Department of Defense (“DOD”) provided interpretive guidance 
indicating that it viewed all killings or destruction of property that were 
caused by DPH to be LOAC violations.115  Initially, military courts 
rejected that interpretation.  In the Jawad case, the military judge rejected 
the prosecution’s theory that DPH “by itself, is a violation of the laws of 
war.”116  Military judges in two other cases similarly rejected the 
government’s attempts to transform DPH into a per se violation of 
LOAC.117 
After Congress revised the MCA in 2009, the DOD issued more 
explicit interpretive guidelines specifying that military commissions had 
                                                                                                             
66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) (creating the new offense of “Murder by an 
Unprivileged Belligerent”). 
109 Frakt, supra note 20, at 732–34; see also Hafetz, supra note 13, at 850–51. 
110 Frakt, supra note 20, at 737. 
111 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  See generally 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (invalidating 
the military commissions). 
112 Frakt, supra note 20, at 741. 
113 See id. 744–49 (discussing the case of Mohammad Jawad); David J. R. Frakt, Mohammed 
Jawad and the Military Commissions of Guantánamo, 60 DUKE L.J. 1367 (2010). 
114 Frakt, supra note 20, at 742, n.59. 
115 Id. at 736. 
116 Id. at 746 (quoting United States v. Jawad, 2008 U.S. CMCR LEXIS, at *1 (A.C.M.R. 
Sept. 28, 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (Ruling on Defense Motion to Dismiss—
Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction (D-007)). 
117 Frakt, supra note 20, at 747. 
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jurisdiction to try people accused of DPH and could convict them of 
crimes including murder “even if such conduct does not violate the 
international law of war.”118  The DOD interpretation is mind-boggling:  
Why would a military commission have jurisdiction over a crime 
allegedly committed by a civilian that is not war crime? 
Faced with the DOD’s obstinate insistence on the authority of 
military commissions to try crimes that are not war crimes, military 
judges finally caved.  In October 2010, a military commission accepted 
the guilty plea of Omar Khadr, despite the fact that he was charged with 
doing nothing more than taking part in a conventional battle and using a 
conventional weapon (a hand grenade) to kill a U.S. fighter.119  The 
military commission denied various motions to dismiss the murder 
charge against Khadr based on the fact that Khadr had not committed a 
war crime.120  Because the case was resolved through a plea bargain, the 
military commission never issued a definitive ruling on the issue.121  
However, in United States v. Hamdan, the Court of Military Commission 
Review issued a unanimous en banc decision adopting the DOD’s view 
that DPH itself could be prosecuted as a war crime.122 
The notion that DPH could be a war crime remains largely untested.  
To this day, the prosecution of Omar Khadr, who was fifteen at the time 
that he committed the acts that led to his prosecution, stands as the only 
example of a conviction based on DPH as a war crime.123  Professor Frakt 
proposes a narrower definition of the crime, limiting its application to 
“those who cross international borders—as alien insurgents—for the 
specific purpose of engaging in hostilities.”124  Professor Frakt 
immediately notes that both the Australian David Hicks and the 
Canadian Omar Khadr could be prosecuted under such a rule, although 
                                                 
118 Id. at 747 (emphasis omitted) (citing U.S. MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMM’NS, pt. IV, 
§ 5(15)(c), at IV-13 (2010)). 
119 Id. at 748 (citing Defendant’s Motion for Leave to Dismiss Complaint Without 
Prejudice and Supporting Brief at *1, United States v. Khadr, Crim. No. 07-30014, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS, at 93015 (2007)). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 755–57.  As Professor Frakt reports, the same court later expressed its reluctance 
to “make conduct punishable by military commission without any reference to international 
norms.”  Id. 757 (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. al Bahlul, MCR 09-001 (U.S. 
Ct. Military Comm’n Review Sept. 9, 2011) (en banc)). 
123 Id. at 762. 
124 Id. at 763. 
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Khadr might be spared based on the fact that his father brought him to 
Afghanistan.125 
Professor Frakt’s recommendation would benefit some civilians 
engaged in DPH who could sincerely claim that they were merely 
protecting their homes and homelands from an invading force.  His 
proposal would render U.S. law more humane, but it would not bring 
U.S. law, which criminalizes DPH, into line with LOAC, which does not.  
Taken together, Professor Frakt’s and Professor Hafetz’s contributions 
suggest that we need to move beyond domestic law solutions to the 
constellation of problems that arise out of asymmetrical conflicts.  The 
three contributions discussed in the final Part of this Introduction do just 
that. 
II.  REGULATING THE NEW WARFARE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIMES 
Three of our contributors propose radically divergent solutions for 
the problems arising out of the new warfare.  Lieutenant Colonel 
VanLandingham envisions an evolving rule of custom within LOAC that 
would permit multilateral humanitarian intervention, making use of 
regional organizations recognized under Chapter 8 of the U.N. 
Charter.126  Major Pedden proposes to address the challenges of the new 
warfare through a new “minilateralism” and through a clear delineation 
between international humanitarian law and international human rights 
law, with the former being granted priority under the principle of lex 
specialis derogat legi generali.127  Professor Blank proposes to address DPH 
problems along with other complexities associated with the new warfare 
through enforcement at the national, regional, and international levels 
that will provide appropriate sanctions for violations of the principle of 
distinction.  The contributions to this Issue of Professor Blank and Major 
Pedden are unusual in the realm of international humanities law (“IHL”) 
scholarship because of their focus on the operationalization of LOAC.128  
                                                 
125 Id.   It also may be relevant that since Khadr’s family moved to Afghanistan in 1995, 
long before the United States invaded, it is hard to see how he could have traveled to 
Afghanistan with the intention of engaging in hostilities.  Id.  
126 U.N. Charter arts. 52–54. 
127 Major Iain D. Pedden, Lex Lacunae:  The Merging Laws of War and Human Rights in 
Counterinsurgency, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 803, 806 n.14 (2012).  For a discussion of the term, see 
Moisès Naìm, Minilateralism:  The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (July/Aug. 2009), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/18/ 
minilateralism. 
128 See also Blank & Guiora, supra note 4, at 57–58 (describing operationalization as 
adapting LOAC to the realities of new warfare so that commanders are equipped with 
proper training regimes and operational guidelines). 
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That is, they focus not only on LOAC as defined in international 
agreements, but also on state conduct as evidenced in military strategies, 
military handbooks, and rules of engagement. 
A. Expanding the Right of Humanitarian Intervention within the U.N. 
System 
Since the end of World War II, there have been occasional stirrings of 
hope that collective security might actually bring an end to conventional 
state-on-state warfare.  Such was the design of the U.N. Charter’s 
Chapter VII,129 of course, but the Cold War intervened to prevent the 
promise of the Charter from being realized.130  As Lieutenant Colonel 
VanLandingham details, individual states stepped into the breach, but 
their actions that may have had humanitarian aims were tainted by self-
interest, and world opinion neither effectively condoned nor prevented 
such interventions.131  There was a brief renaissance of hope for collective 
security in the 1990s as the United States was able, with the approval of 
the U.N. Security Council, to assemble an international coalition to 
oppose the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait.132  Between 1990 and 1995, the 
Security Council authorized the use of force in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda, and Haiti.133  But the brief window of opportunity quickly 
slammed shut, as the international community was unable to intervene 
to prevent genocides in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, and NATO somewhat 
notoriously bombed Serbia without Security Council authorization in 
order to prevent Serb atrocities in Kosovo.134 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Security Council was willing 
to authorize collective action to combat terrorism,135 but it would not go 
so far as to authorize a renewal of hostilities against the government of 
                                                 
129 U.N. Charter arts. 39–51. 
130 See Rachel E. VanLandingham, The Stars Aligned:  The Legality, Legitimacy, and Legacy of 
2011’s Humanitarian Intervention in Libya, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 859, 873 (2012) (noting the 
voting rules in the Security Council stymied Security Council action and “frequently 
neutered the entire UN collective security regime during” the Cold War). 
131 Id. at 877–80. 
132 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990) (calling on member states, 
acting in coordination with the Government of Kuwait, to use all necessary means to 
implement previous Resolutions relating to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait). 
133 VanLandingham, supra note 130, at 800. 
134 See id. at 868 (contending the Security Council’s authorization of humanitarian 
intervention in Libya weakens any claim that intervention without such authorization 
could be lawful). 
135 See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (calling on member states to 
use all necessary means to combat terrorism); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 
12, 2001) (expressing readiness to take all necessary measures to respond to the terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001). 
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Saddam Hussein in Iraq.136  Because the Security Council was once again 
paralyzed by disunity among its five permanent members, individual 
states and coalitions assumed the dominant role in collective security. 
Drawing on the recent U.N Security Council authorization of NATO 
intervention in Libya,137 Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham finds 
grounds for optimism regarding the future prospects for effective 
collective security measures in response to significant humanitarian 
crises.  Her contribution interacts with the other contributions to this 
Issue in interesting ways.  It suggests that, in the future, asymmetrical 
warfare will be more of an issue for international law than for domestic 
law, as the conflicts will be between multinational forces and armed 
militias or the militaries of failed states.  Lieutenant Colonel 
VanLandingham also suggests that the advent of Predator drone 
technology may embolden military powers to engage in humanitarian 
intervention more often, as they can do so without risk to their own 
personnel.138  On the other hand, one might predict that if, as Lieutenant 
Colonel VanLandingham suggests, U.N.-authorized humanitarian 
intervention becomes the norm, there might be fewer asymmetrical 
conflicts in the future because the U.N. might come to play its intended 
role as a deterrent force to states or non-state actors that might otherwise 
be inclined to resort to force. 
As Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham describes the Libya 
intervention, it was made possible by a variety of developing doctrines, 
none of which quite fit the situation, but which have come together in a 
constellation of doctrines that she believes has the potential to harden 
into a rule of customary international law.  Such a rule would permit 
Security Council authorized humanitarian intervention.  The Security 
Council has for some time recognized that human rights abuses can 
“constitute a threat to international peace and security,” even if they 
occur in only one state.139  In addition, Lieutenant Colonel 
VanLandingham contends that the Security Council Resolution 
authorizing intervention in Libya implements and reinforces the 
“responsibility to protect doctrine” that the international community 
                                                 
136 See Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?, 97 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 590, 592–93 (2003) (describing the U.N. Security Council’s refusal to go along with 
U.S. and U.K. demands for authorization of an invasion of Iraq). 
137 See VanLandingham, supra note 130, at 859 (citing S.C. Res. 1973, ¶¶ 4, 6–8, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011)), which authorized the use of force in Libya in response to the 
humanitarian crisis brought about by the popular uprising that sought to remove 
Muammar Gaddafi from power). 
138 Id. at 865–66. 
139 Id. at 860. 
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endorsed in 2005.140  Finally, Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham’s 
analysis of the rhetoric underlying statements in support of intervention 
in Libya suggests a growing sense among states of a moral norm 
justifying humanitarian intervention to prevent mass atrocities.141 
Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham suggests that as humanitarian 
intervention becomes more common, the difficult targeting decisions 
that are the subject matter of the other contributions to this Issue will 
also increase in frequency.  She contends that the advent of drone 
warfare will further complicate matters if states will contend, as the 
United States did with respect to the Libyan conflict, that their 
involvement in such conflicts do not constitute “hostilities.”142  However, 
two points seem essential in this context.  First, the Obama 
administration’s claim that U.S. involvement in the NATO intervention 
in Libya did not constitute “hostilities” for the purposes of the War 
Powers Resolution surprised many,143 who, like the Author of this 
Introduction and Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham, expected from 
the Obama administration (and from the Legal Advisor to the 
                                                 
140 Id. at 861. 
141 Id. at 864. 
142 Id. at 866 (citing Robert M. Chesney, A Primer on the Libya/War Powers Resolution 
Compliance Debate, BROOKINGS (June 17, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ 
2011/0617_war_powers_chesney.aspx?p=1); see also Harold Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep’t 
of State, Testimony on Libya and War Powers Before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee (June 28, 2011), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ 
Koh_Testimony.pdf.  The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (2000)), calls for congressional authorization 
of all uses of the U.S. armed forces within sixty days of their introduction into “hostilities” 
absent a declaration of war, an extension, or a wartime emergency that prevents Congress 
from meeting.  War Powers Resolution, § 5(b), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541, 1544(b).  The Obama 
administration decided to avoid a confrontation with Congress over the legality of 
continued U.S. participation in NATO actions in Libya by contending that, limited as they 
were to air strikes and air support, U.S. participation in that NATO action did not 
constitute “hostilities.”  Charlie Savage & Mark Landler, White House Defends Continuing 
U.S. Role in Libya Operation, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes. 
com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.html?page wanted=all. 
143 According to the New York Times, the U.S. military aircraft attacked Libyan air 
defenses about sixty times, and U.S.-operated drones fired missiles at Qaddafi’s forces 
about thirty times.  Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in Libya Followed 
Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A8.  In contending the U.S. involvement in 
Libya did not constitute “hostilities,” the Obama administration did not even have the 
support of the Pentagon or the OLC, both of which reached the opposite conclusion.  
Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html?hp; see also 
Louis Fisher, Testimony of Louis Fisher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
(June 28, 2011), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fisher_Testimony. 
pdf (denouncing “[p]residential [d]oubletalk” with respect to the concept of “hostilities”). 
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Department of State, Harold Koh)144 greater transparency and 
compliance with the rule of law, especially with respect to war powers.145  
Second, as the administration’s definition of “hostilities” is directly 
relevant only for the purposes of the War Powers Resolution and 
domestic law, it bears only a relationship of analogy to standards under 
LOAC for establishing when the resort to force rises to the level of an 
armed conflict. 
But Lieutenant Colonel VanLandingham’s focus on this constellation 
of doctrines that promote multinational intervention, whether based on a 
“right” of humanitarian intervention or a “responsibility to protect” 
suggests an erosion of traditional notions of state sovereignty.146  Her 
work thus tracks themes in the development of international legal norms 
that may run counter to Major Pedden’s focus on the need for the United 
States to work towards minilateral solutions to international challenges. 
B. Protecting Combatants through Treaty Law and the Lex Specialis 
Principle 
The point of departure for Major Pedden’s work is the relationship 
between IHL and international human rights law.  On that issue, the 
United States has adopted the minority view that, in areas in which the 
two bodies of law overlap, IHL should be recognized as the lex specialis, 
which trumps the more general human rights law.147  The U.S. view has 
some support from the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”), which has 
twice recognized the lex specialis status of LOAC.148  However, as Major 
                                                 
144 For condemnations of Koh’s inconsistency on the issue in the years before and after he 
joined the Obama administration, see, for example, Paul Starobin, A Moral Flip-Flop? 
Defining a War, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/opinion/ 
sunday/harold-kohs-flip-flop-on-the-libya-question.html?_r=2&ref=opinion; Mary Ellen 
O’Connell, U.S. Strains Credibility on Its Libya Role, CNN (June 21, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/06/21/oconnell.libya.military/index.html. 
145 See Bruce Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A27 
(criticizing the Obama administration for ignoring the advice of the OLC); see also Trevor 
W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch 
Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. FORUM 62, 74 (2011) (calling upon the Obama 
administration to reaffirm its commitment to the tradition of executive branch deference to 
the OLC’s conclusions). 
146 VanLandingham, supra note 130, at 864–65. 
147 Pedden, supra note 127, at 810–11. 
148 See id. 816–19 (discussing the ICJ’s advisory opinions of the Use or Threat of Nuclear 
Weapons and on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory). 
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Pedden notes, the ICJ has done little to clarify how to handle cases that 
implicate both bodies of law.149 
The more prominent view is that the two bodies of law are 
complementary—that is, wherever possible, courts should construe the 
bodies of law as consistent with one another.150  As a result, human 
rights principles have gained increasing prominence in international 
adjudications involving LOAC.  Major Pedden concedes that human 
rights frameworks have also informed the U.S. Supreme Court’s wartime 
jurisprudence in cases relating to the U.S. government’s detention 
policies in the War on Terror.151 
Major Pedden does not question the importance of human rights 
considerations at the level of rules of engagement.152  In reviewing the 
tactical directives issued by U.S. generals directing the counter-
insurgency program in Afghanistan, as well as major works of 
counterinsurgency theory, Major Pedden acknowledges that they adopt 
an approach consistent with complementarity.153  As a result, the Tactical 
Directives issued by the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) 
in Afghanistan, unclassified versions of which are attached as 
appendices to Major Pedden’s contribution,154 expose ISAF forces to 
increased risk.155  However, he maintains, rules of engagement adopted 
as a matter of policy cannot and should not ripen into rules of binding 
customary international law.  “[T]he fact that we fight this way now 
should not require us to fight this way forever.”156  Given that “the 
influence of human rights law in armed conflict shifts more risk onto 
combat personnel . . . [resulting in] more casualties,”157 the need for state 
consent to emerging rules of custom is nowhere more important than in 
the realm of LOAC. 
Major Pedden raises reasonable concerns that documents like the 
ICRC Guidance and the ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law 
                                                 
149 See id. 816–17 (observing the ambiguity of the ICJ’s invocation of lex specialis in the 
Nuclear Weapons case and that its later decision in the Wall case “did little to clarify the issue 
in a meaningful way”). 
150 Id. at 810–11. 
151 Id. at 818. 
152 See id. 812 (citing the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement as an example of the 
“effective importation of a widely-known legal standard from the human rights law 
framework into the law of war”). 
153 Id. at 821–24. 
154 Id. at apps. B–D. 
155 Id. at 805. 
156 Id. at 825 (emphasis in original). 
157 Id. at 819. 
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Study,158 which import human rights standards into LOAC, can 
contribute to an environment in which state practice alone is treated as 
sufficient evidence of customary rules of law, without any evidence that 
such practice is accompanied by opinio juris;159 that is, that state practice 
is informed by the belief that the practice is required by international 
law.160  In particular, Major Pedden echoes W. Hays Parks’ concerns that 
the ICRC Guidance’s Recommendation IX imports into its DPH analysis 
a proportionality test borrowed from human rights law.161 
Major Pedden offers two proposals that would permit the United 
States to reconcile conflicts between LOAC and human rights law.  First, 
he calls for “[t]he use of inherent executive authority to harmonize the 
expression of the opinio juris in documents related to armed conflict.”162  
Second, because of the challenges to finding international unanimity on 
all matters relating to LOAC, Major Pedden suggests that the United 
States adopt “minilateral” solutions to national security problems by 
forging with like-minded states international agreements that would 
have greater legitimacy in the eyes of the international community than 
do unilateral declarations of states’ understandings of the requirements 
of LOAC.163 
Major Pedden extols the virtues of a minimalism that would allow 
states to quickly negotiate an agreement that would not be diluted by the 
need to satisfy too many participants.164  He contends that minilateral 
treaties agreed upon by a “critical mass” of specially affected states 
would achieve greater legitimacy in the world community than can 
unilateral actions or statements of the law.165  One area in which Major 
Pedden suggests that minilateral approach might be effective is the law 
of targeted killing.166 
At the same time, Major Pedden suggests that U.S. conduct must be 
accompanied by and consistent with statements coming from the 
Executive that express U.S. constructions of the opinio juris associated 
                                                 
158 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005). 
159 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2) 
cmt c. (1987) (“For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it 
must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris 
sive necessitatis) . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
160 Pedden, supra note 127, at 813–14. 
161 Id. at 815. 
162 Id. at 805. 
163 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
164 Id. 826–27. 
165 Id. at 828. 
166 Id.  
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with particular aspects of customary international law.167  But Major 
Pedden is not encouraged by the Obama administration’s embrace of the 
“fundamental guarantees” enumerated in AP I’s Article 75,168 because 
President Obama’s statement has increased confusion over whether or 
not the United States is bound by Article 75 as a matter of customary 
international law and over whether LOAC or humanitarian law 
governs.169  But Article 75 is emblematic of the difficulty in trying to keep 
these two bodies of law separate.  Although it incorporates language 
from human rights treaties,170 it is part of AP I and thus unquestionably a 
part of LOAC as well. 
C. Preserving Distinction in New Warfare 
In different ways, the work of Professors Hafetz and Frakt suggests 
that we should avoid attaching excessive criminal consequences to DPH.  
Professor Blank, while not calling for the criminalization of DPH and 
certainly not endorsing the improvisational chaos and human rights 
abuses associated with the War on Terror’s treatment of terror suspects, 
seeks to bring the focus back to key principles.  In particular, she argues 
that effective implementation of and adherence to LOAC depends on 
robust enforcement of all violations of the principle of distinction—that 
is, distinction in conduct, and not only in targeting―through the 
mechanisms of military justice and through national, regional, and 
international sanctions, and accountability regimes.  Her work, like that 
of Major Pedden, focuses on the operationalization of LOAC principles 
at the level of the Rules of Engagement (“ROE”) that inform combat 
decisions, and she addresses not only DPH but the broader problem of 
violations of the principle of distinction in the new warfare. 
As Professor Blank notes, distinction has two components.  First, it 
permits the targeting of combatants and prohibits the targeting of non-
combatants, unless they engage in DPH.  Second, it requires that 
combatants identify themselves as such.171  Professor Blank points out 
that international criminal tribunals have repeatedly imposed criminal 
sanctions for the intentional targeting of civilians,172 and the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome Statute”) also 
imposes sanctions for targeting decisions that violate the principle of 
                                                 
167 Id. at 829. 
168 Id. at 830–31. 
169 Id. at 831. 
170 See id. at 830 n.163 (noting the language of Article 75 was “distilled from the ICCPR”). 
171 Blank, supra note 15, at 766. 
172 See id. at 782 (discussing cases decided by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Yugoslavia). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/1
2012] Introduction 725 
proportionality by causing excessive harm to civilians.173  In addition, 
national courts enforce national criminal codes and military manuals 
that impose criminal sanctions for indiscriminate or intentional attacks 
on civilians.174 
Despite this progress in enforcing one aspect of the principle of 
distinction, there is at present little, if any, enforcement of violations and 
accountability for the equally serious problem of combatants who 
undermine the principle of distinction by disguising themselves as 
civilians.175  “Fighters who launch attacks in civilian clothing, from 
protected civilian sites and use civilians as shields are violating LOAC 
and must be held accountable for their conduct.”176  Unless those who do 
so are held accountable, “distinction will only be enforced halfway.”177  
Blank notes numerous cases in which LOAC rules prohibiting perfidious 
attacks have been ignored in cases to which they obviously applied.178 
Perfidy undermines the principle of distinction, thus leaving 
combatants to perceive civilians as potential combatants and justifiable 
targets.  Professor Blank correctly notes that the victims of perfidy are 
the innocent civilians who “become the unintentional and tragic targets 
of soldiers who mistake them for legitimate targets when unable to 
distinguish between fighters and civilians.”179  More generally, the 
victims are innocent civilians who are targeted because combatants have 
come to doubt their ability to distinguish between combatants and non-
combatants, or the victims may be wounded combatants placed hors de 
combat who are shot because soldiers have come to fear treachery by 
wounded combatants who play possum.180 
Yet prosecutions of perfidy are not always the appropriate response.  
Professor Blank discusses the perfidy of suicide bombers and of Bosnian 
Serbs who disguised themselves as U.N. peacekeepers and then 
massacred Bosnian Muslims who voluntarily surrendered.  The threat of 
criminal prosecution will not deter a suicide bomber, and the Bosnian 
Serbs at Srebrenica were not prosecuted for perfidy because they were 
                                                 
173 See id. at 781 (discussing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90). 
174 Id. at 782–83. 
175 Id. at 766. 
176 Id. at 778. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. 786–88 (citing the U.N. report on Sri Lanka and the Bosnian Serb massacre at 
Srebrenica, in which thousands of Bosnian Muslims were tricked into surrendering to—
and were later massacred by—Serbs disguised as UN peacekeepers). 
179 Id. at 790. 
180 See SOLIS, supra note 3, at 327–30 (describing the U.S. soldiers’ practice in the Iraq War, 
known as “double-tap[ping],” which involved “shooting of wounded or apparently dead 
insurgents to insure that they are dead”). 
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prosecuted for genocide and crimes against humanity,181 which Professor 
Blank acknowledges is a justifiable reason to forego a prosecution for 
perfidy.182 
The placement of military objectives in residential areas or in 
protected places such as hospitals or places of worship is also a LOAC 
violation that undermines the principles of distinction.183  Professor 
Blank emphasizes the obligation of all parties to take precautionary 
measures to protect civilian populations.184  While legal commentary and 
the news media have focused on violations of the obligation to take 
precautions by states that have attacked military installations in civilian 
areas,185 less attention has focused on the violations embodied in the 
placement of such military installations in civilian areas in the first 
place.186  Similarly, Professor Blank notes that the widespread practice of 
using civilians as human shields—a clear violation of AP I, Article 51 
and customary international law187—is rarely prosecuted in national 
courts or international tribunals.188 
Professor Blank does not see prosecutions as a panacea.  Rather, 
training manuals and military leaders must treat protecting the principle 
of distinction as a high priority, and to a large extent they already do so.  
Professor Blank’s focus on the operationalization of LOAC illustrates a 
degree of flexibility in the lawful ROE applicable to different types of 
armed conflict.  For example, Professor Blank notes that the ROE for the 
conflict in Iraq focused on status-based targeting, designating certain 
paramilitary “groups and organizations” as “hostile and engaged,” and 
therefore appropriate for targeting.189  In Afghanistan, by way of 
contrast, it was much more difficult to identify hostile groups and 
organizations.  The ROE applicable in Afghanistan thus called for 
conduct-based targeting based on hostile acts or manifest hostile 
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intent.190  The fact that ROE can be adapted in response to the 
idiosyncrasies of a particular conflict means that ROE can be calibrated 
to assure LOAC is operationalized in ways that “maximize protection of 
innocent civilians while still enabling mission fulfillment.”191 
Where fighters fail to engage in combat in accordance with the 
principle of distinction, the failure to hold them accountable simply 
ratifies their unlawful behavior and encourages future violations that 
only serve to endanger innocent civilians.  The mechanisms for 
enforcement are already in place, as “[n]ational courts, national criminal 
codes, and military manuals also criminalize attacks on civilians.”192  
International fact-finding investigations are also an important 
mechanism for establishing both the factual basis and the legal issues 
that arise out of particular armed conflicts.193  While states must be 
willing to prosecute their own personnel for perfidious conduct, 
international tribunals should prosecute with equal vigor all serious 
violations of the principle of distinction.  National and international fact-
finding investigations should provide a basis for a more robust system of 
accountability that would create more comprehensive enforcement of 
both aspects of the principle of distinction. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
If we combine Professor Blank’s advocacy of transnational solutions 
to violations of the principle of distinction with Major Pedden’s 
advocacy of minilateralism, we may arrive at a solution that can address 
the concerns of all of our contributors.  Major Pedden sees 
internationalism primarily as a source of new international obligations 
that will increase the risks faced by U.S. armed forces in facing 
counterinsurgency.  But a minilateral approach to the question of 
criminal sanctions for DPH is a real possibility and would have a great 
deal more international legitimacy than do the ad hoc domestic regimes 
described by Professors Hafetz and Frakt.  Minilateral solutions are also 
appropriate in the context of humanitarian interventions under the 
auspices of regional organizations for which Lieutenant Colonel 
VanLandingham advocates. 
Thus the contributions to this Issue, each useful on its own, are 
especially valuable when read together.  They offer a wealth of 
information on the subject of asymmetrical conflict, as well as proposals 
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for means by which greater clarity can be achieved in the realm of the 
fundamental LOAC principle of distinction. 
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